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In equilibrium play of a two-round tournament we ﬁnd that underdogs exert more eﬀort in the opening
round while favorites save more eﬀort for the ﬁnal. Ability diﬀerences between players are therefore
compressed in the opening round so upsets are more likely, and ampliﬁed in the ﬁnal so blowouts are
more likely. Measures that reduce the need to strategically allocate eﬀort across games make for a more
exciting ﬁnal but a less exciting opening round. Consistent with the model, introduction of a one-day
rest period between regional semi-ﬁnal and ﬁnal matches in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament
was found to increase the favorite’s victory margin in the semi-ﬁnals by about ﬁve points. Non-sports
applications of the model include the allocation of resources across primaries and general elections by
candidates and the allocation of resources across a career ladder by managers.
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Popular discussions of tournament play often celebrate the success of underdogs in early rounds and decry
the prevalence of unexciting ﬁnals. Such a pattern might be just a statistical illusion. There are many early
round matches and some upsets are inevitable. And there is only one ﬁnal so it is unlikely to be the most
exciting match of the tournament. In this paper we consider instead whether the pattern might have a real
foundation in the strategic allocation of eﬀort by tournament participants.
We analyze a two-round tournament in which a favorite and underdog play in each of the two semi-ﬁnals
and then one player from each match advances to the ﬁnal. Victory in a match is probabilistic in that
the chance of winning is increasing in each player’s relative quality and in his relative eﬀort expenditure.1
Each player has a ﬁxed amount of eﬀort to exert over the two rounds, unused eﬀort is of no value, and the
only payoﬀ is from winning the tournament. To maximize the chance of winning, each player must balance
out the beneﬁts of expending more eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal against the opportunity cost of having less eﬀort
available for the ﬁnal.
Favorites and underdogs both have an incentive to conserve resources for the ﬁnal, but the trade-oﬀs
they each face are diﬀerent. A favorite plays a weak opponent in the semi-ﬁnal, but is likely to face a tough
opponent in the ﬁnal, so it has a strong incentive to hold back. Conversely, an underdog already plays a tough
opponent in the semi-ﬁnal, so it has less incentive to conserve eﬀort for the ﬁnal.2 Because of these diﬀerent
incentives, we ﬁnd that in any symmetric Nash equilibrium underdogs exert more eﬀort than favorites in
the semi-ﬁnal. The extra eﬀort does not fully compensate for lower ability and underdogs are still likely to
lose, but the chance of an upset rises. In the ﬁnal round each player expends all its remaining resources so
diﬀerences in abilities are no longer compressed by strategic considerations. Instead, an underdog who makes
it to the ﬁnal has fewer resources left to spend than the favorite, so diﬀerences in abilities are ampliﬁed and
the chance of a blowout by the favorite rises.
If a favored player loses to an underdog in the early rounds it is often accused of “looking past” the
underdog to its next match. Even if a player’s strategy is optimal ex ante, it might turn out to be unsuccessful
ex post, so such criticism is often unfair. Our results imply that it is rational for the favorite to hold back
on resources in the semi-ﬁnal even if it correctly anticipates that in equilibrium the underdog will be playing
harder. Sometimes the strategy will backﬁre, but on average the favorite beneﬁts from being in a better
position for the ﬁnal.
These results are derived using a standard contest model in which each player’s probability of victory in a
match is a strictly increasing function of his ability and eﬀort.3 Such models were ﬁrst developed to analyze
1Being a better player can be interpreted to mean that the player uses resources more eﬃciently, or that the player has a
larger resource endowment. Both interpretations are equivalent in our model, so we use the ﬁrst one without loss of generality.
2Our model assumes that there is no “runner-up” prize for reaching the ﬁnal but losing. Since the underdog has less chance
of winning the ﬁnal, such a prize gives the underdog even more incentive to spend resources on the opening round at the expense
of being more likely to lose the ﬁnal. For simplicity we do not include this eﬀect in the formal model.
3A related literature, which has also been applied to a wide range of situations, considers all-pay auctions in which the
highest bidder wins for certain (Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1996).
1rent-seeking (Tullock, 1967, 1980) and similar models are used in a wide variety of areas including patent
races (Loury, 1979), election campaigns (Snyder, 1989), compensation schemes (Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz, 1983),
career ladders (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), lobbying (Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993), and sports contests
(Szymanski, 2003).4 More speciﬁcally, we model the contest as a sequential elimination ladder tournament
in which players ﬁrst compete in separate groups and the winners then compete against each other (Rosen,
1986).
Our result that underdogs do indeed “try harder” than favorites in the semi-ﬁnals contrasts with that of
Rosen (1986).5 Because the favorite has a better chance of victory in the ﬁnal, Rosen ﬁnds that winning a
semi-ﬁnal match is more valuable to the favorite so the favorite tries harder than the underdog. We reach
t h eo p p o s i t ec o n c l u s i o nb e c a u s ew ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ei saﬁxed supply of eﬀort to be used across rounds
a n du n u s e de ﬀort in the tournament has no value. Since players lose nothing from trying hard other than
having less eﬀort for the ﬁnal, and since favorites have more incentive to save eﬀort for the ﬁnal, underdogs
try harder in the semi-ﬁnals. While not directly comparable, our results also diﬀer in ﬂavor from results
on relative eﬀort levels in single-round tournaments. For instance, Baik (2004) ﬁnds that favorites and
underdogs exert the same eﬀort, while Dixit (1987) ﬁnds that underdogs have an incentive to precommit to
less eﬀort and that favorites have an incentive to precommit to more eﬀort.
The eﬀect of asymmetric abilities in sequential elimination ladder tournaments is also considered by
Groh, Moldovanu, Sela, and Sunde (2003) in an analysis of optimal seedings. The primary diﬀerence with
our model is we assume there is a resource constraint for total eﬀort in the tournament. The eﬀect of such
resource constraints is analyzed by Stein and Rapoport (2003). Their model diﬀers in that they consider
the case where players have identical abilities and they concentrate on tournament design issues. Amegashie
(2004) also considers a tournament with budget constraints and asymmetric abilities, but rather than having
a ladder structure the players all compete against each other in a single opening round match and then the
best performers are selected to compete against each other in the ﬁnal round.
If players have separate budgets for each round then the strategic factors we examine disappear. That
is, all players will “give 100%” in each round so the probability of an upset in the opening round will not
be increased by the favorite withholding eﬀort. We exploit this implication to test our model empirically
by looking at data from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. Before 1969, the regional semi-ﬁnals and
regional ﬁnals were played back-to-back on two consecutive days so teams had little time to recover from the
semi-ﬁnal or prepare for the ﬁnal. In 1969, the NCAA introduced a rest day between the matches, thereby
reducing the need to allocate eﬀort and preparation time strategically. Since favorites were more free to “play
one game at a time” and focus on defeating their semi-ﬁnal opponents, our model predicts that semi-ﬁnal
upsets were less likely starting in 1969 than in previous years. Consistent with the model’s prediction we
ﬁnd that after introduction of the rest day the number of upsets fell and that the average victory margin for
the favored team increased by about ﬁve points despite a long-term trend toward greater parity.
4For a survey see Nitzan (1994). Baye and Hoppe (2002) show the formal connection between many of these models.
5Rosen considers this question brieﬂy in Section IV. The bulk of his paper examines other issues.
2In addition to sports tournaments, our results apply to other situations with similar tournament struc-
tures, including multi-round hiring decisions, multi-division promotion ladders, and election campaigns with
a primary and general election. For instance, if the favored candidate in a primary election conserves re-
sources for the general election, the underdog candidate is more likely to win, but on average the favored
candidate is still wise to hold back. Rules that restrict the amount of resources spent on the primaries
are typically thought to favor underdogs because favorites are likely to have more resources. Our analysis
suggests that, when resources endowments are the same, strategic allocation of resources across the primary
and general elections helps weaker candidates, so capping resources in the primary can instead help the
stronger candidate.6
2 The Model
Four players compete in a tournament with a semi-ﬁnal and ﬁnal round. Each player is endowed with 1 unit
of eﬀort to allocate across the two rounds. In each of two semi-ﬁnals two players compete by simultaneously
choosing eﬀort levels which inﬂuence the probability of winning the match.7 The two semi-ﬁnal winners
advance to the ﬁnal and compete for a prize of normalized value 1 by expending their remaining eﬀort
resources. There is no runner-up prize for a player who advances to the ﬁnal but loses. The only cost of
eﬀort is the opportunity cost of having less eﬀort available for the other round, and eﬀort saved by a player
who does not advance to the ﬁnal has no value.8
In each given match (semi-ﬁnal or ﬁnal), the probability with which a player wins that match depends
on his own eﬀort level in the match, the eﬀort level of the opposing player, and his relative ability compared
to the opposing player. In particular, if a player expends eﬀort x ∈ [0,1], the opposing player expends eﬀort





rx +y if x>0o ry>0,
r
r+1 if x = y =0 .
(1)
This is an asymmetric version of the familiar Tullock success function.9 Note that the marginal return to
6Resources can be though of quite generally. For instance, “going negative” is a costly strategy for the candidate making
criticisms in that it loses voter goodwill. Underdogs might then be more inclined than favorites to use negative advertising in
the primary.
7In sports contests the simultaneity assumption is most appropriate regarding the allocation of preparation time by players
and coaches before the match. Regarding physical eﬀort in the match itself, it can be adjusted based on circumstances. For
instance, the coach can give more playing time to the best players if the team is behind. But the impact on the outcome is
still probabilistic so the coach cannot be sure of how much playing time is appropriate, and the basic intuition of the model is
unaﬀected.
8We therefore implicitly assume an extreme version of convex eﬀort costs in which eﬀort has zero cost up to the ﬁrst unit,
and inﬁnite cost thereafter. With such a cost function it is clearly optimal to use the one unit of resources, but not more, so
the model can be reduced to the allocation problem described in the text.
9This function is popular because of its simplicity and the fact that it typically yields pure strategy equilibria. When the












3 < 0. (2)
We assume that there are only two types of players, “strong” favorites and “weak” underdogs. The
diﬀerence between these types is that a favorite’s ability is higher than that of an underdog. Speciﬁcally,
we measure this ability diﬀerence by the parameter g>1. If a favorite is matched against an underdog the
favorite’s relative ability is given by r = g>1 and the underdog’s relative ability by r =1 /g < 1. If either
a favorite is matched against another favorite or an underdog against another underdog, the relative ability
of either player is r = 1. We assume the semi-ﬁnal pairings consist of one favorite and one underdog.
2.1 The players’ allocation decisions
Let s1 be the eﬀort of the (strong) favorite in the ﬁrst semi-ﬁnal and w1 be the eﬀort of the (weak) underdog
in that semi-ﬁnal. The probability that the favorite wins the ﬁrst semi-ﬁnal is then f(g,s1,w 1)a n dt h e
probability that the underdog wins is f(1/g,w1,s 1). Similarly in the second semi-ﬁnal let s2 be the eﬀort
of the favorite and w2 be the eﬀort of the underdog, so the probability that the favorite wins the second
semi-ﬁnal is f(g,s2,w 2) and the probability that the underdog wins is f(1/g,w2,s 2).
Since each player’s total eﬀort budget is 1, and unused eﬀort has no value, if a player makes it to the ﬁnal
it will expend eﬀort equal to 1 minus its eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal. Consider the favorite in the ﬁrst semi-ﬁnal.
It has a f(g,s1,w 1)c h a n c eo fm a k i n gi tt ot h eﬁnal. If it makes it to the ﬁnal the chance of facing an equally
strong opponent is f(g,s2,w 2), in which case the chance of victory is f(1,1−s1,1−s2), and the chance of
facing a weak opponent is f(1/g,w2,s 2), in which case the chance of victory is f(g,1−s1,1−w2). Therefore
for i,j =1 ,2a n di 6= j the probability that favorite in the ith semi-ﬁnal wins the tournament is
πS















and, similarly, the probability that the underdog in the ith semi-ﬁnal wins the tournament is
πW















Since there are no eﬀort costs and since the prize is 1 from victory in the ﬁn a la n d0f r o ma n y t h i n gl e s s ,t h e
expected payoﬀ to each player is just the probability of winning the tournament.
probability of victory is very sensitive to relative eﬀort only mixed strategy equilibria may exist (Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries,
1994).
42.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium each player maximizes the probability of winning the tournament taking the allocation deci-
sions by the other players as given, including the players in the other semi-ﬁnal. As seen from the probability
functions (3) and (4), each player faces a trade-oﬀ.H i g h e r e ﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal increases the chance of
making it to the ﬁnal, but at the opportunity cost of a lower chance of succeeding in the ﬁnal. Because
f(g,x,y)i sc o n c a v ei nx, there are diminishing returns from eﬀort in both rounds. Therefore each player’s
probability of winning the tournament is a concave function of eﬀort by the player: it is initially increasing
when the marginal return to eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal is high and the marginal cost of having less eﬀort for the
ﬁnal is low, and then decreasing when the marginal return to eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal is low and the marginal
cost of having less eﬀort for the ﬁnal is high.






































































Since (3) and (4) are concave functions in their respective decision variables, the ﬁrst-order conditions are
also suﬃcient for a maximum. Throughout the rest of the paper, we only consider symmetric Nash equilibria,
meaning that the favorite in one semi-ﬁnal uses the same strategy as the favorite in the other semi-ﬁnal, and
likewise for the underdogs. Henceforth when we refer to equilibrium, we will mean a symmetric equilibrium
in which s1 = s2 = s and w1 = w2 = w. Invoking symmetry and making some minor simpliﬁcations, the









































Note that eﬀort levels at the corners cannot be part of any equilibrium. If, for instance, favorites spend
zero eﬀort in the ﬁrst round, they are assured to lose the tournament unless underdogs also spend zero eﬀort.
But in that case, each team can discontinuously increase its chance of winning the tournament by allocating
5Figure 1: Reaction functions for symmetric equilibrium.
an inﬁnitesimal amount of eﬀort to the ﬁrst round. A similar argument shows that allocating all available
resources to the ﬁrst round is not optimal either. Thus, to ﬁnd equilibria of the model we may restrict our
attention to eﬀort levels that are strictly between zero and one.
For each w ∈ (0,1), call s∗(w)t h ev a l u eo fs that solves (7), and likewise for each s ∈ (0,1), call w∗(s)t h e
value of w that solves (8) (in the Appendix we show that these solutions are indeed well-deﬁned). A symmetric
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is then a pair (s∗,w ∗)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes s∗ = s∗(w∗)a n dw∗ = w∗(s∗).
Figure 1 depicts representative reaction functions s∗(w)a n dw∗(s) generated by (7) and (8).10 As y m -
metric equilibrium occurs at the point where they intersect. Note that this intersection is in the northwest
half of the diagram where s<w , implying that underdogs exert more eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal and that
10These functions already include the assumption that both favorites follow the same strategy and both underdogs follow the
same strategy. Hence they limit our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria. The particular functions shown were generated by
setting g =4 .
6favorites have more eﬀort remaining for the ﬁnal, 1 − s>1 − w. Note also that the equilibrium lies in the
region where w<g s , implying from (1) that f(1/g,w∗,s ∗) < 1
2. Therefore, although underdogs exert more
eﬀort than favorites in the semi-ﬁnal, they do not exert so much more as to become the new favorite.11 In
fact, as stated in the following proposition, these properties always hold in our model.12
Proposition 1 A symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium (s∗,w ∗) exists. In any such equilibrium, the
underdog exerts more eﬀort than the favorite in the semi-ﬁnal, but not enough to overcome the favorite’s
ability advantage, s∗ <w ∗ <g s ∗.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. We ﬁrst show that s∗(w)a n dw∗(s)e a c hi n t e r s e c tt h e
45-degree line at exactly one point in (0,1)2 and that s∗(w) intersects it from below while w∗(s) intersects it
from above. As can be seen from examination of Figure 1, this implies that s∗ and w∗ intersect each other
in the interior of the strategy space at least once so a symmetric Nash equilibrium always exists. It is then
shown that s∗ intersects at a lower value than w∗ does and that s∗(w) is strictly increasing in w.T h e s e
restrictions imply that any such intersection is above the 45-degree line, so s∗ <w ∗. Finally, to show that
w∗ <g s ∗ we use proof by contradiction based on direct manipulation of the equilibrium conditions.13
Why do underdogs “front-load” eﬀort to early rounds, while favorites “back-load” eﬀort to the ﬁnals? To
gain some intuition for the result, consider the problem of a favorite. In the semi-ﬁnal he is paired against an
underdog. If he gets to the ﬁnal there is a chance he will face an underdog again, but also a chance he will
face the other favorite. Therefore the expected quality of a favorite’s opponents increases as the tournament
progresses. Conversely, an underdog is paired against a favorite in the semi-ﬁnal. If he gets to the ﬁnal,
there is a chance that he will have to play a favorite again, but also a chance that he will play an underdog.
Therefore the expected quality of an underdog’s opponents decreases as the tournament progresses. Given
these changes in opponent quality over the course of the tournament, an equal eﬀort allocation for all players
is clearly not an equilibrium. Favorites would have an incentive to shift some eﬀort to the ﬁnal where the
marginal eﬀect on the probability of winning is higher. Similarly, underdogs would have an incentive to shift
some eﬀort to the ﬁrst round. Only if the underdogs exert more eﬀort than favorites in the semi-ﬁnal, and
if the favorites exert more eﬀort than underdogs in the ﬁnal, can each player’s marginal return from eﬀort
in the semi-ﬁnal be equal to the opportunity cost of having less eﬀort remaining for the ﬁnal.
The strategic allocation of eﬀort identiﬁed in Proposition 1 arises because the players have a single budget
constraint for the whole tournament and can substitute their eﬀort across rounds. To gain more insight into
the model, it is worth comparing how outcomes diﬀer when eﬀort expenditures by the two players in a match
are equal. This would result if players naively allocated half of their eﬀort to each round. It would also result
11In the example of Figure 1 where g = 4, strategic allocation of eﬀort raises the probability of an upset from 1/(1 + g)=.2
to w∗/(gs∗ + w∗)=.529/(4(.397)+.529) = .250, which is still well below 1/2.
12Again we are following the literature in limiting attention to symmetric equilibria. There may also be asymmetric equilibria
and we cannot be assured that they have the same properties as the symmetric equilibria we examine.
13Although we have not found any such situations, there may be multiple intersections, implying the existence of multiple
equilibria. Any symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies has the properties that we identify.
7if the players had a separate eﬀort budget in each round and could not substitute eﬀort across rounds. For
instance, if the interval between rounds was suﬃcient for the players to fully recover, then the players would
have a full unit of eﬀort to expend in each round.14 Since the success function f(r,x,y) is homogenous of
degree zero in (x,y)t h ee x a c ta m o u n to fe ﬀort in a match does not matter as long as it is the same for both
players. Let the amount be e ∈ [0,1].15
One question is whether strategic allocation of eﬀort across rounds makes an upset in the semi-ﬁnal more











Now consider how this higher probability of an upset in the semi-ﬁnal aﬀects the likely matchups in the
ﬁnal. The ﬁnal is between a favorite and an underdog if either the favorite in the ﬁrst semi-ﬁnal wins and
the underdog in the second semi-ﬁnal wins, or vice-versa. Because strategic allocation of eﬀort pushes the
chance of an upset in each semi-ﬁnal closer to 1/2 but not above it, the probability of a ﬁnal between a












2 (g+1)2 > 0, (10)
where the inequality follows from w∗ >s ∗, gs∗ >w ∗,a n dg>1. Not only does strategic allocation of eﬀort
lead to more favorite-underdog matches in the ﬁnal, but the underdog has less remaining resources, so the
favorite is more likely to win these matches than in the case of equal eﬀort expenditures. In particular,
f(g,1 − s∗,1 − w∗) − f(g,e,e)=
g(w∗ − s∗)
(g(1 − s∗)+1− w∗)(g +1 )
> 0, (11)
where the inequality follows from w∗ >s ∗.
These results from inequalities (9) — (11) are stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Compared to the equal eﬀort case, in any symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium: (i) the
probability that an underdog defeats a favorite in the semi-ﬁnal is higher; (ii) the probability that a favorite
and an underdog meet in the ﬁnal is higher; and (iii) the probability that a favorite-underdog ﬁnal is won by
the favorite is higher.
Although the model does not directly predict the margin of victory, the margin is likely to be correlated
with relative eﬀort levels and the probability of victory. Therefore Propositions 1 and 2 support the basic
intuition that the strategic allocation of resources across the tournament makes close matches in the semi-
ﬁnals and a “blowout” in the championship more likely.
14That they would in fact use all of it follows from our simplifying assumption that unused eﬀort has no value.
15For simplicity we assume that all eﬀort levels in the tournament are the same, but the results hold as long as eﬀort levels
by the two players in each match are the same, even if eﬀort varies across matches.
8Now consider how the allocation of eﬀort aﬀects whether a favorite or underdog is most likely to win the
whole tournament. From (3), with equal eﬀort the probability that a given favorite wins the tournament is,

















With strategic allocation of eﬀort the probability is, for i =1 ,2,
πS















The respective probabilities that one of the two favorites wins are therefore 2πS
i (e,e,e,e)a n d2 πS
i (s∗,w ∗,s ∗,w ∗).






as implied by Proposition 2(i), favorites are less likely to advance to the ﬁnal than with equal eﬀort levels.
Second, if they do make it to the ﬁnal they have more resources left to compete. This second eﬀect does not
matter if two favorites meet since the probability of victory is 1/2 in either case, but if a favorite meets an
underdog the probability of victory rises to
g(1 − s∗)




as shown in Proposition 2(iii). From direct comparison of (12) and (13) the relative strength of the two
eﬀects is not obvious. The following proposition, which is proven in the Appendix, uses indirect methods
based on an underdog’s probability of winning the tournament to show that the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates
the second eﬀect. Even though allocation of eﬀort across rounds makes it more likely that the favorite
wins a match with an underdog, the probability that two underdogs reach the ﬁnal increases enough that a
favorite is less likely overall to win the tournament than in the case of equal eﬀort expenditures.
Proposition 3 Compared to the equal eﬀort case, in any symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium the
probability that a favorite wins the tournament is lower.
3E m p i r i c a l T e s t
Because of their formalized structure and data availability, sporting contests are particularly amenable to
empirical tests of strategic behavior. To test whether the strategic resource allocation eﬀects derived in
our model are present in actual contests, we use data from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. This
sequential elimination tournament features invited U.S. college teams which ﬁrst compete to be one of the
“Final Four” regional champions and then compete for the national title. The tournament is attractive for our
purposes because a structural change in the tournament’s schedule allows us to contrast team behavior under
9two diﬀerent resource constraints.16 Before 1969, semi-ﬁnal and ﬁnal matches were played on consecutive
days so coaches and players had little time to recover from the semi-ﬁnals and prepare for the ﬁnals. Starting
in 1969, the NCAA introduced a rest day between the matches in order to “provide greater preparation time
for the coaches involved” and “give more rest to the players”.17
The rest day was introduced in both the regional championships and in the national championship.
Because there are four regional championships every year, but only one national championship, there are
four times as many observations on the regional level, so we test our model using regional data. While the
entire tournament extends over more than just the two regional rounds, there is a multi-day (usually about
one week) break between any preliminary matches and the regional semi-ﬁnals, and about a one week break
between the regional ﬁnals and the national championships. Therefore, from the perspective of allocating
resources across matches, the regional semi-ﬁnals and ﬁn a l sc a nb ev i e w e di nr e l a t i v ei s o l a t i o nf r o mt h er e s t
of the tournament and our basic model of a two-round tournament can be applied.18
Our model predicts that the introduction of the rest day should have had diﬀering eﬀects on favorites
and underdogs. Before 1969 when teams had to allocate their resources across the two rounds, favorites had
a strong incentive to hold back on eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal because they expected to play a better team in
the ﬁnal. Underdogs also had some incentive to conserve eﬀort, but they were already playing a strong team
in the semi-ﬁnal so they had less incentive to hold back. Therefore, from Proposition 1, without the rest
day we expect underdogs to allocate more eﬀort to the semi-ﬁnal than favorites do.19 After introduction
of the rest day, teams could recover from the semi-ﬁnal before the ﬁnal so the need to allocate resources
across the tournament should have declined or disappeared. Therefore, as discussed in the previous section,
teams should have come closer to fully exerting themselves in each match. Based on this result, Proposition
2(i) predicts there will be fewer upsets in the semi-ﬁnals after introduction of the rest day, Proposition 2(ii)
predicts there will be fewer pairings in the ﬁnal between the favorite from one semi-ﬁnal and the underdog
from the other, Proposition 2(iii) predicts such matches will be less likely to be won by the favorite, and
16This tournament is also attractive for testing the model because the duration of matches is not endogenous to player
strategies except for rare overtime matches. In tournaments where the duration of matches is endogenous, e.g. the NBA
tournament where a match is won after one team wins a majority of n games, or tennis tournaments where a match is won
after one player wins a majority of n sets, a favorite that tries to save resources can instead ﬁnd itself wasting resources on a
longer match than necessary.
17These were the ﬁrst two reasons cited by the “Report of the Executive Committee” in the NCAA’s Proceedings of the 62nd
Annual Convention - 1968. Better press coverage was the third reason.
18Since semi-ﬁnal matches are played sequentially rather than simultaneously, players in the second match may have the
opportunity to adjust their eﬀort levels based on the outcome of the ﬁrst match. However, such adjustments will be incomplete
since it is too late for players and coaches to adjust their preparation time for the semi-ﬁnal. For simplicity we abstract from
this issue.
19Recall that we are assuming there is no cost to eﬀort other than the opportunity cost of having less eﬀort available for the
next match. This simplifying assumption may not be appropriate for professional tournaments where players have been shown
to vary their eﬀort based on ﬁnancial rewards (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990). The idea that college basketball players in the
tournament are willing to “go all out” is indirectl ys u p p o r t e db yM c C l u r ea n dS p e c t o r( 1 9 9 7 )w h oﬁnd that higher ﬁnancial
rewards for colleges do not aﬀect performance levels.
10Proposition 3 predicts that the overall probability of a favorite winning the regional championship will higher.
Since all of the model’s predictions follow from the main result of Proposition 1, we concentrate our
formal analysis on measuring relative eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal matches. The other predictions, which are more
indirect and therefore more diﬃcult to test, are brieﬂy analyzed at the end of the empirical section.
3.1 Data and preliminary analysis
For each match in the tournament we observe the victor, the point scores of the two teams, and whether or
not the game went into overtime.20 To measure the quality of teams we use the ﬁnal UPI poll which ranked
the top 20 teams after the regular season and immediately before the start of the tournament.21 Ideally we
would like to observe each team’s eﬀort level and the resulting probability of winning, but clearly this is not
possible. However, the relative scores of the two teams can be used as a noisy measure of relative eﬀort.22
To the extent that we can condition on the teams’ relative quality, this measure will be more accurate.
To evaluate the impact of the rest day, we look at symmetric windows on either side of the change in
1969. The NCAA tournament began in 1939 but the modern system of four regional championships did
not start until 1952.23 Therefore the broadest possible window includes the 17 years 1952-1968 and the
subsequent 17 years 1969-1985. We also consider a narrower 10-year window on either side of the change
to reduce the impact of other unmeasured factors that might be changing concurrently. Every year there
are four regional championship tournaments with two semi-ﬁnal matches each. Therefore for the 34 years
of data in the 17-year window there are a possible 272 matches in the sample, and for the 20 years of data
in the 10-year window there are a possible 160 matches in the sample. Unranked teams, which are assigned
the censored rank of 21, cannot be compared with other unranked teams so we discard matches in which
both teams are unranked, leaving a sample of 249 matches for the 17-year window and 151 matches for the
10-year window.
As a ﬁrst step to get some perspective on the data let us examine how average winning margins of favored
teams have changed over time. Positive margins are assigned to victories by favored teams, negative margins
are assigned to upsets, and zero margins are assigned to games that go into overtime. We compute the
20Tournament data is from the oﬃcial NCAA site, http://www.ncaasports.com.
21The AP poll is the other major poll, but for the period 1963-1968 the AP only reported the top 10 teams.
The NCAA did not start its own ranking of teams in the tournament until 1979. UPI rankings are from
http://www.sportsstats.com/bball/rankings/national.rankings.by.year. Results are very similar if we use the AP top 10 data
available from http://www.ncaasports.com. Rankings for teams in the 11-20 range are comparatively noisy so matches between
teams in this range contribute little to our regression results.
22An alternative to the actual scores is Las Vegas point spreads. Assuming that gamblers anticipate the eﬀects we consider,
this ex ante measure should be less noisy, but we were unable to ﬁnd point spread data for most of the sample period.
23Before 1951 there were only 8 teams in the in the tournament and only two regional championships. The number of
participants rose to 16 teams in 1951 but the creation of four regional championships (and the concurrent adjustment to rest
periods before the national championship) did not occur until the following year. Note that the number of participants increased
further to 22 in 1953, and then ranged from 23 to 25 until 1975 when 32 teams participated. The number was again increased
to 40 teams in 1979, to 48 teams in 1980, and ﬁnally to 64 teams in 1985.
11Figure 2: Average semi-ﬁnals victory margin with prediction from trend and rest day dummy variable
average margin for each year and regress the resulting sequence against a time trend and a rest day dummy
variable that is set to zero until 1968 and to one after that. The result of this regression for the 17-year
window is depicted in Figure 2. (Results for the 10-year window are similar.) Note that there is a long-term
trend toward greater parity, presumably as athletic ability rises asymptotically toward physical maximums.24
Consistent with Proposition 1, this trend appears to have been temporarily reversed in 1969 when the rest
day was introduced. For the 17-year window, inclusion of the rest day dummy variable raises the adjusted
R2 from .146 to .218. For the 10-year window, where the long-run trend toward parity is less apparent,
inclusion raises the adjusted R2 from only -.030 to .265. However, while suggestive, these regressions are not
conclusive because they are based on annual averages rather than on match-level data.25
24Such a trend would be captured in our model by a decrease in g. Greater parity is most apparent in individual sports
such as running where world records have improved at a decreasing rate and victory margins have narrowed. In the NCAA
tournament such a trend could also result from the increasing number of teams admitted to the tournament. Toward the end
of the period so many teams were starting the tournament that surviving to the regional semi-ﬁnals (the “Sweet Sixteen”) had
become a strong signal of a team’s ability, even if a team was poorly ranked before the tournament. However, the number of
participants was nearly constant from 1953 to 1975 during which most of the fall in victory margins occurred. The issue of
survival bias through the course of a tournament is analyzed in Abrevaya (2002).
25The coeﬃcient for the dummy variable is 6.11 in the 10-year window regression and 4.33 in the 17-year window regression.
The t-statistics are 2.36 and 1.69. The dummy variable coeﬃcients for robust regressions are similar and the t-statistics are
2.14 and 2.03 respectively.
12Table 1: Regression results for impact of rest day on semi-ﬁnal victory margins
10-year window (1959-1978) Full 17-year window (1952-1985)
OLS Robust OLS Robust
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Year variable equals calendar year minus 1900. Rest Day dummy variable equals 1 starting in Year 69.
3.2 Estimation and results
To see whether the patterns suggested by Figure 2 are statistically signiﬁcant, we use match-level data for
the 10-year and 17-year windows before and after the change. Match-level data allows us to avoid statistical
problems due to averaging and also allows us to condition on the rankings of the two teams so that the
victory margin is a more accurate measure of relative eﬀorts. We perform standard OLS regressions and also
robust regressions that iteratively reweight the observations to reduce the impact of large outliers.26 In our
case such outliers could arise from the stochastic relationship between victory margins and relative eﬀort or
from the imperfect (and censored) measurement of team ability.27
Looking at Table 1, we ﬁrst regress the victory margin of the favorite against the year trend and the rest
day dummy. This regression is the match-level equivalent of the regression shown in Figure 2. Second, we
26We use the rreg command from STATA which uses a mixture of Huber weights and bi-weights to reweight the regression.
27For each speciﬁcation the robust regression procedure assigns the smallest weight to #1 UCLA’s 49-point victory over
unranked Wyoming in 1967. The diﬀerent regressions predict only about a 9-point victory, but undefeated UCLA (the eventual
tournament champion) was an unusually strong #1 team, Wyoming with a 15-12 record was an unusually weak unranked team,
and UCLA, which had not made it to the tournament the previous year after winning the tournament two years in a row, might
have been less averse to running up the score than the typical favorite.
13perform the same regression except we condition on the diﬀerence in rankings between the underdog and
the favorite where better teams have lower ranks. Third, we regress the diﬀerence in the square roots of
the scores against the year trend and the rest day dummy. Fourth, we again condition on the diﬀerence in
rankings between the underdog and the favorite, but we use square roots of the rankings.
The regression results tend to support the basic trend in Figure 2 of decreasing margins over time with
a jump in 1969 when the rest day is introduced. In particular, when we condition on the rankings the rest
day dummy is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in all of the OLS regressions and at the 5% level in all of the
robust regressions.28 Coeﬃcient signs for the other variables are also as predicted and signiﬁcant, with more
signiﬁcant results for the full 17-year window.29 Using square roots tends to increase the overall predictive
power of the regressions, but has little impact on the signiﬁcance of the rest day dummy.30 Adjusted R2s
(available only for the OLS regressions) are small as is typical in cross-sectional data, reaching a high of .101
for the 17-year window regression with square root victory margins and square root rankings.
Regarding alternative measures of eﬀort besides victory margins, one attractive measure is minutes played
by the best players, but scorekeepers did not record this statistic regularly until late in the sample period. A
related measure, for which data is available for all matches in the 10-year window around 1969, is percentage
of total points scored by the starting players. Our model predicts that before 1969 favorites should have
relied on their starting players less than underdogs did so as to save their energies for the ﬁnal, and that
this diﬀerence should have narrowed after introduction of the rest day in 1969. This measure of eﬀort turns
out to be somewhat noisy, presumably because the number of players with strong oﬀensive talents varies
substantially across teams, but the overall trend is consistent with the model. Before 1969, starting players
for favored teams accounted for about 5% less of their team’s total points than did starting players for
underdog teams, and this diﬀerence completely disappeared after 1969. Regressing this diﬀerence in share
of points by starting players against a time trend and the rest day dummy, the rest day dummy is always
positive as predicted and consistent with a 5%-10% shift, but the coeﬃcient is typically not signiﬁcant.31
3.3 Other predictions
Now consider brieﬂy the other predictions of the model. Proposition 2(i) predicts a decrease in the number
of semi-ﬁnal upsets following the change in 1969. The binary outcome of an upset or not is a noisier measure
of relative eﬀort than is the victory margin, but the numbers are consistent with the theory. For instance,
28If one-sided tests are used the rest day dummy is also signiﬁc a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e li nt h eO L Sr e g r e s s i o n s .T h e( u n r e p o r t e d )
results for median regression, another method for handling outliers, are of similar signiﬁcance as the robust regression results.
29Similar results also hold for the unbalanced window 1952—2000.
30Results are also very similar for diﬀerent ways of conditioning on relative strength, such as using logs or taking the square
root of the diﬀerence in ranks rather than the diﬀerence in the square root of ranks.
31The results improve if we restrict the sample to matches where the stronger teams are in diﬀerent semi-ﬁnals. Using annual
average data, the dummy variable is then signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the robust regression. Using match-level data and
performing the equivalent regressions as in Table 1, the rest day dummy is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the OLS regressions
but is still not signiﬁcant in the robustr e g r e s s i o n s .
14in the ﬁve years 1964—1968 before the change there were 13 upsets in the semi-ﬁnals, while in the ﬁve years
1969—1973 after the change there were only 8 upsets. Looking at a narrower window around the change, there
were 8 upsets in 1967 and 1968, and only 2 upsets in 1969 and 1970. However, with wider time windows,
the long-run trend toward greater parity washes out the resource allocation eﬀects observed around 1969.
For instance, in the full 17 years 1952—1968 there were 28 upsets, while in the subsequent 17 years 1969—1985
there were 39 upsets.
Proposition 2(ii) predicts that the number of ﬁnals featuring the favored team from one semi-ﬁnal and
the underdog from the other semi-ﬁnal should decrease after introduction of the rest day. It turns out that
there is little diﬀerence in the number of favorite-underdog pairings in the ﬁnals before and after 1969. For
instance, in the ﬁve years before the change there were 7 such pairings and in the ﬁve years after the change
there were 8 such pairings. The number of pairings is even noisier than the total number of upsets because in
many cases there are upsets in both semi-ﬁnals, and such cases are more likely when upsets are more likely.
Therefore we simply do not have a large enough sample to accurately test the prediction. A similar problem
occurs when we try to test whether favorites are more likely to win ﬁnal matches against underdogs before
introduction of the rest day — the implication of Proposition 2(iii). Overall, only about one fourth of all
games result in upsets, and these include cases where there are upsets in both semi-ﬁnals. Furthermore, the
model assumes that the stronger teams are in diﬀerent semi-ﬁnals, which is not always the case. This does
not present a problem for the basic intuition that the stronger team in each semi-ﬁnal has more incentive
to conserve resources,32 but it can change the prediction regarding the ﬁnals. Therefore, to test Proposition
2(iii) we need to limit the sample to cases where there is an upset in only one semi-ﬁnal and where the two
strongest teams are in diﬀerent semi-ﬁnals. Doing so reduces the number of usable data points by so much
that an accurate test becomes impossible. For instance, in the ten years before the change, only 10 out of
40 matches ﬁt our criteria, and only 12 do so in the ten years after the change.
Proposition 3 predicts that a favored team is more likely to win the tournament after introduction of the
rest day. This prediction, too, is diﬃcult to test because there are only four regional championships each
year and favored teams are still very likely to win, with or without the rest day. Nevertheless, the numbers
are consistent with our theory in that in the ﬁve years before the change, 15 of the 20 regional championships
were won by one of the two best teams from the semi-ﬁnals, and in the ﬁve years after the change this share
increased to 18 out of 20.33
32For instance, if a strong team and a very strong team meet in one semi-ﬁnal and a weak team and a very weak team meet
in the other semi-ﬁnal, then the very strong team still has more incentive to hold back than the strong team, and the weak
team still has more incentive to hold back than the very weak team. This pattern holds in numerical simulations based on
generalizations of equations (5)—(6).
33If we only consider matches where the favorites are in diﬀerent semi-ﬁnals, 10 of 13 regional championships are won by
favorites in the ﬁve years before the change, and 15 of 15 regional championships are won by favorites in the ﬁve years after
the change.
154C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops and tests a model of a two-round sequential elimination tournament among resource-
constrained players of varying ability. We take the design of the tournament as given, but clearly these results
have implications for tournament design (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). For sports tournaments, the main concern
is probably the excitement value of the matches as measured by intensity of the play and uncertainty over
the likely victor (Chan, Courty, and Li, 2003). This paper implies that increasing excitement at one level of
the tournament involves a trade-oﬀ in reducing excitement at the other level. For election campaigns, a key
concern for each party is ensuring that the strongest candidate makes it to the general election (Klumpp and
Polborn, 2003). This paper suggests that spending constraints and other restrictions at the primary level
can reduce the problem of a weak candidate upsetting a better candidate who saves resources for the general
election. For career ladders, a main concern is ensuring that the best manager makes it to the top. This
paper indicates that strategic allocation of eﬀort, e.g. managers delaying having children so as to be less
encumbered for competition early in their careers, increases the chance of a less talented manager prevailing.
Under such circumstances performance measures alone may not be the best selection criteria.
Appendix
In this Appendix we prove the propositions that are stated in the main text. To this end, we ﬁrst establish
the following intermediate result:
Lemma 1 For every w ∈ (0,1),t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u es∗(w) ∈ (0,1) that solves (7), and for every s ∈ (0,1),
there exists a unique w∗(s) ∈ (0,1) that solves (8). Furthermore, s∗ and w∗ are continuous functions on
(0,1),a n ds∗ increases in w.
For equation (7) denote the left-hand side as FS
L(s,w)a n dt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ea sFS
R(s,w). Similarly
for equation (8) denote the left-hand side as FW
L (s,w) and the right-hand side as FW
R (s,w). The proof
is organized in two main steps, one for s∗ and one for w∗. Each step is divided into three substeps: (a)
existence, (b) uniqueness, and (c) continuity. For s∗ there is an additional substep (d) in which we establish
monotonicity.
Step 1. s∗ exists and is unique and continuous in w.
Step 1a.
Observe that, for ﬁxed w ∈ (0,1), FS
R strictly increases in s, FS
R(0,w) = 0, and FS
R(1,w)=∞.S i n c e
FS
L(0,w)a n dFS




To show that s∗ is unique for given w,w en o ws h o wt h a tFS
L decreases in s.D i ﬀerentiating with respect to







w2−1+4 w − 3w2 − 2gsw + g2(1+s2−2s)+2 gs
(gs+w)2b2 ,
which is non-positive if and only if the term in the numerator,
£




2gs+ g2(1 + s2 − 2s)
¤
≡ L, (14)
is non-negative. Our approach is to minimize (14). Consider the value for w ﬁrst. The second term in
brackets in (14) is independent of w, while the ﬁrst term is minimized if w ∈ {0,1}.I f w =0 ,t h e n
L = −1+[ g2(1 + s2 − 2s)+2 gs], which is minimized if s =( g − 1)/g,s ot h a tL =2 ( g − 1) > 0. If w =1 ,
then L = −2gs+[g2(1+s2 −2s)+2gs]=g2(1+s2 −2s), which is minimized if s =1 ,s ot h a tL = 0. Hence
L ≥ 0a n dFS






R are continuous in w for w ∈ (0,1), s∗ is continuous on (0,1).
Step 1d.
It can be shown that FS




















It is easy to see that h(s,w)i n c r e a s e si nw. We further know from Step 1b that for each w there is a unique
s∗(w) that solves (15). Since h(0,w) ≥ 0, h(s,w)m u s tb ed o w n w a r ds l o p i n gi ns at s = s∗(w). From the
implicit function theorem, it follows that s∗(w)i n c r e a s e si nw.
Step 2. w∗ exists and is unique and continuous in s.
Step 2a.
Observe that, for ﬁxed s ∈ (0,1), FW
R strictly increases in w, FW
R (s,0) = 0, and FW
R (s,1) = ∞.S i n c e
FW
L (s,0) and FW




Establishing uniqueness of w∗ is more complicated than for s∗,s i n c eFW
L may be increasing in w.W e
show the following: If FW
L is increasing in w on a subset of (0,1), then it is concave on (0,1). Noting that
FW
L (s,0) > 0=FW
R (s,0), concavity implies that the two curves intersect exactly once. After some algebra,
the ﬁrst two derivatives of FW




























L2(w)=g3s(2s2 − 3s +1 )+g2(1 − s)(1 − 3sw)+g(1 − s)(2 − 3w)+( 1−w)3.
Now let M1(w)=2 L1(w) − b2 and M2(w)=2 L2(w) − b3. These functions are continuous in w ∈ (0,1).
Observe that M1(w) < (>)0iﬀ FW
L (s,w) is increasing (decreasing) at w,a n dM2(w) < (>)0iﬀ FW
L (s,w)
is concave (convex) at w. In the following, it will be convenient to extend FW
L , L1, L2, M1 and M2 to all
w ∈ R, and assume that s ∈ [0,1].
Let us ﬁrst examine the slope of FW
L .N o t i c et h a tM1 is quadratic in w with a positive coeﬃcient. This
implies that FW
L will either be always decreasing in w on R, or have one local maximum and one local
minimum in w on R. If this is the case, then the solutions for M1(w)=0a r eg i v e nb y
w =1 −g(1−s)−
√
A, w =1 −g(1−s)+
√
A,
where A = g2(4s2 − 6s +2 )− 2g(1 − s)a n dw corresponds to the local minimum of FL
B and w to the local
maximum. We now verify that w < 0o rw =1 .F o rw to be a real number, A ≥ 0, which implies s ≥ 1o r
s ≤ 1
2(1− 1
g). In the ﬁrst case, only s = 1 is relevant, and w = 1. In the second case, note that 1−g(1−s) < 0
for all s<1 − 1
g.T h u s ,i f s<1
2(1 − 1
g), w1 < 0. For the slope of FW
L ,t h i sl e a v e su sw i t ht h r e ep o s s i b l e
cases:
(1) w ≤ w ≤ 0o rw =1≤ w ⇒ FL
B is decreasing on [0,1],
(2) w < 0 < 1 ≤ w ⇒ FW
L is increasing on [0,1],
(3) w < 0 < w<1 ⇒ FW
L is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing on [0,1].
In case (1), Step 2b is complete. For the other two cases, we need to check the curvature of FW
L ;i n
particular we want to show that FW
L is concave. If it is, then Step 2b is complete. It can be shown that the




In cases (2) and (3) above, w < 0a n dw>0. Since M1(w)=0 ,s oFW
L and M2 have local maxima at
w. Furthermore, M2(w) ≤ 0, for otherwise FW
L would be convex at a local maximum, which is impossible.
Since w is the only extremum of M2 on [0,1], it must be that M2(w) ≤ 0f o rw ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, FW
L is




R are continuous in s for s ∈ (0,1), w∗ is continuous on (0,1).
184.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: Existence. Any interior intersection of s∗ and w∗ from Lemma 1 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
We now examine the points at which s∗ and w∗ intersect the 45-degree line in (s,w)-space. Substituting














Thus, w∗(ψW)=ψW,a n dw∗ intersects the 45-degree line at s = ψW.
The numbers ψS and ψW are unique, well-deﬁned, and positive. We now show that ψS < 1a n dψW < 1;
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Next, recall that by Lemma 1, s∗ and w∗ are continuous functions on (0,1) and have values in (0,1). Any
intersection is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. So to prove existence, we need to show that they intersect in












sb2 + w(1 − w)(1 − s)
¸
. (16)
The curve deﬁned by (16) coincides with s∗ for w ∈ (0,1), but extends continuously to [0,1]. Since neither
(s =1 ,w =1 )n o r( s =0 ,w = 1) satisfy (16), we conclude that 0 < limw→1 s∗(w) < 1. The same steps
applied to (8) show that lims→1 w∗(s) ∈ (0,1). Next, since s∗ crosses the 45-degree line exactly once in (0,1),
the fact that limw→1 s∗(w) ∈ (0,1) implies that for w<(>)ψS, s∗(w) < (>)w. Likewise, since w∗ crosses
the 45-degree line exactly once in (0,1), the fact that lims→1 w∗(s) ∈ (0,1) implies that for s<(>)ψW,
w∗(s) > (<)s. It is then impossible for s∗ and w∗ not to intersect each other in (0,1)2. Hence, a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium exists.













Since both s∗ and w∗ are continuous functions on (0,1),ψS <ψ W implies that s∗ and w∗ intersect at a point
above the 45-degree line, i.e. where w>s . Furthermore, since s∗ increases, there cannot be an intersection
of s∗ and w∗ below the 45-degree line, so in every equilibrium s∗ <w ∗.
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Condition (17) is necessary (but not suﬃcient) for equilibrium. Now suppose, contrary to the proposition,
























and therefore A1A2 ≥ A1g 1
A1 = g>1 so condition (17) cannot hold. Therefore (s,w)w i t hw ≥ gs cannot
be an equilibrium.





2 = 1. Therefore to show that 2πS
i (s∗,w∗,s ∗,w ∗) < 2πS
i (e,e,e,e)f o r
i =1 ,2i ti se q u i v a l e n tt os h o wt h a t2 πW
i (s∗,w ∗,s ∗,w∗) > 2πW
i (e,e,e,e). To prove this we will show that
πW
i (s∗,w∗,s ∗,w ∗) ≥ πW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,w∗) >π W
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,s ∗)=πW
i (e,e,e,e). First note that πW
i (s∗,w∗,s ∗,w ∗)
is the underdog’s equilibrium probability of winning the tournament while πW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,w∗) is the under-
dog’s probability of winning the tournament when the underdog chooses eﬀort s∗ instead of the equilibrium
eﬀort w∗. By the deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium, πW
i (s∗,w∗,s ∗,w ∗) ≥ πW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,w ∗). Now comparing
πW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,w ∗)w i t hπW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,s ∗),
πW

































i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,w ∗) − πW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,s ∗)=
1
g +1
[w∗(1 + 3g)+g(g − 1)(2 − s∗)](w∗ − s∗)
2(w∗ + gs∗)(2− s∗ − w∗)(g +1 )
2 > 0,
where the inequality follows from w∗ >s ∗ and g>1. The ﬁnal equality that πW
i (s∗,s ∗,s ∗,s ∗)=πW
i (e,e,e,e)
follows from (12) and (19).
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